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A government policy regarding the reduction of state shares in state-owned
enterprises (SOE) triggered a crash in the Chinese stock market. The sus-
tained depression even after policy adjustments constitutes a puzzle￿ the so
called ￿state-share paradox.￿The empirical evidence shows that the sustained
depression is supported by a regime switching model with an absorbing state.
The theoretical explanation developed in this paper arises from the concept of
rational panics, which generates an inverted-S actual demand curve and gives
rise to potential multiple equilibria. Rational panics hypothesis in this paper
suggests that the dual pricing system and the quota on the overall stock supply
represent major policy failures.
Keywords: Chinese Stock Market, Market Crash, and Inverted-S Demand
Curve.
(JEL G18, E65, O16)1 Introduction
The phenomenon of crashes has long puzzled both participants and observers
of stock markets. The challenge is to explain sharp price drops triggered by rel-
atively important new events. Moreover, the stock market can remain low for
a substantial amount of time without immediately bouncing back. Empirically,
this is consistent with regime switching with an absorbing state. Theoretically,
a recent approach interprets crashes as alternating realizations of multiple equi-
libria.
The Chinese stock markets have seen much more crashes than those in the
mature markets. A government policy regarding the reduction of state shares
in state-owned enterprises (SOE) triggered a crash in the Chinese stock market.
The sustained depression even after policy adjustments constitutes a puzzle￿
the so called ￿state-share paradox￿ .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: institutional background are
discussed in section 2. In section 3, empirical evidence shows that the salient
features of this crash can be characterized by a model of regime switching with
market return. Section 4 investigates a theoretical hypothesis to explain the
empirical evidence. An inverted-S demand curve is constructed. Multiple equi-
libria and the resulting large drop in prices arise from government intervention.
It also discusses di⁄erent attempted policy changes and their implications for un-
derstanding policy traps. Section 5 concludes with remarks and general lessons
that can be extrapolated from the Chinese case. It is suggested that the type
of modeling used in this paper has larger implications for other research.
2 Institutional Background
Right from the start, the Chinese stock market adopted a strict planned manage-
ment system, with management of issue volume incorporated into the national
credit plan and monetary policy. As a result, along with bank loans and bond
issue, the scale of stock issues became part of the overall money supply, facilitat-
ing the Chinese government￿ s control of social capital. The actual management
method used to control issue volume after 1993 was through the Chinese Securi-
ties Regulatory Commission (CSRC) of the State Council convening a meeting
of relevant departments and commissions, to decide on the overall scale of stock
issue for that year on the basis of current economic development and the state of
the market. In 1997, the CSRC announced new regulations governing the issue
of new shares, with the implementation of a quota system. In order to encour-
age listing of large enterprises and key enterprises, within the restrictions of the
overall quota, only the number of companies that could make public o⁄erings
was limited. However, owing to the numerous failings in quota management,
enterprises and local government began to engage in a wide variety of public
relations (PR) activities to try to secure their own shares of the quota. Such PR
expenditure leads to an increase in rent-seeking activity and numerous cases of
1corruption. In light of this situation, on 16 March 2000, the CSRC announced
the abolishment of the quota system and began moving in the direction of a
listing approval system. Yet, while the government terminated the use of ex-
plicit quotas, asymmetric information between the state and the public about
the supply of total stock shares remained as an implicit limit.
Equity in listed companies is arti￿cially divided into di⁄erent categories of
shares in the same stock￿ state-owned shares, legal-person shares, public shares
and internal employee shares, with di⁄erent rights adhering to each type. State
shares constitute a majority of the total shares and have all the same rights as
public shares. The only di⁄erence is that they can not be sold freely on the
market. The state thereby keeps a dominant position in the SOE. The state
acquired its shares when the SOE were initially converted into stock companies
at book value. Contemporaneous public investors, however, could only acquire
their shares at the market price. Over the last few years, using various methods,
attempts have been made to reduce the number of state shares.
On June 6, 2001, the CSRC announced that the listed state-owned enter-
prises would reduce their state-owned shares and legal-person shares by an
amount equivalent to 10% of the total o⁄erings, through initial public o⁄er-
ings (IPOs) and through seasoned equity o⁄erings (SEOs). Essentially, this is a
privatization program. The immediate target of the program was ￿nancing the
social security system. The revenue from the sale of state-owned shares is to
be remitted to the national social security fund. If the program succeeds in the
early stages, its goals become broader: enhancing competition, improving man-
agement operations, fostering the development of capital market institutions,
broadening share ownership or improving corporate e¢ ciency.
Unfortunately, the forced in￿ ow of lower-value state shares sold on the mar-
ket diluted the price of publicly-owned shares. The result of the government
policy was a precipitous drop in the price level of the stock market. It is impor-
tant to note that the fall did not happen immediately after the announcement of
the policy in June. Rather, the drop began one month afterwards, in July, and
continued into October. The closing indexes of the Shanghai and the Shenzhen
securities exchanges tumbled 32% and 37% respectively by October 22, 2001
(Figure 1).
On October 23, 2001, the CSRC announced the suspension of measures
to reduce the holdings of state shares. The closing indexes increased 10% on
the day, representing the maximum amount of stock volatility permitted by
the government. Moreover, all ￿rms gained on that day. Discussion about
how to reduce state-owned shares continued and public anxiety appeared to be
increasing. The momentum of the upward drive was quickly sapped and all of
the gains were gone by the end of the week. The faltering of the rally may be an
indicator that the temporary suspension of the reduction of state-owned shares
is not enough to create a lasting rally. When the government tried to resume the
policy, announcing a discount selling plan on January 26, 2002, the Shanghai
and the Shenzhen market indexes declined 6.3 % and 6.7% the following business
day, January 28. On that day, 95% of the ￿rms in the Shanghai market and
98% of the ￿rms in the Shenzhen market saw declines.
2On June 24, 2002, the Chinese government decided to permanently terminate
the policy. This sent the Shanghai and the Shenzhen markets sky high. By the
end of that day, both markets closed up 10%. Almost all the ￿rms on both
markets gained. However, even after these strong measures were taken, the
stock markets returned to depressed levels, inconsistent with predictions based
on standard economic models. Chinese stock prices have remained at a low
level. This is the so-called ￿state-share paradox￿ .
3 Empirical Evidence
Figure 1 depicts that the closing prices of the Shanghai A share index ￿ uctuated
from January 2, 2001 to March 5, 2003, based on the news of policy changes.
The salient features of this crash are as follows: (1) The sharp price changes are
triggered by important news; (2) The market jumped down discontinuously but
did not jump down immediately as the negative news was announced; (3) Price
movement is asymmetric: upward jumps are more signi￿cant than downward
jumps after policy adjustments were made; (4) The market has been locked in
the same kind of decreasing trend in spite of positive news.
Most ￿nancial studies involve returns, instead of prices index. Figure 2 shows
time plots of daily log returns of shanghai stock market. The following regime
switching model is chosen to ￿t return data:






The estimated result is shown in table 1.
Note that the transition probability pij gives the probability that state i will
be followed by state j. p11 is signi￿cantly close to 0 while p22 is signi￿cantly
close to 1. Thus st = 2 can be regarded as an absorbed state. Also note that
￿2 = ￿0:1%. This suggests that st = 2 is a state in which price index follows
a decreasing trend. No matter what measures were taken, the stock market
returned to depressed levels positively. Therefore, we can say that the market
has been locked in an absorbing state with the sustained depression.
Note that ￿1 = 7% while ￿2 = ￿0:1%. This suggests that price movement is
asymmetric in the di⁄erent regimes. Positive movements in increasing regimes
are more signi￿cant than negative movements in decreasing regimes. Indeed,
policy adjustments triggered large upward jumps, but momentum of the upward
drive was quickly sapped and it followed a longer process with relatively small
jumps to return to depressed levels.
how to explain the largest jump which is downward jump corresponding to
original policy announcement? We may take a further look at section 4.2.
Finally, it seems that the regime switching model cannot cover all stylized
facts of the crash. There is no information why market did not jump down
immediately as the negative news was announced.
34 Rational Panics Hypothesis
In this section, an explanation will be developed to be consistent with insti-
tutional background and empirical evidence. The explanation arises from the
concept of rational panics, in which expected demand and supply turn out to be
interdependent. This innovation generates an inverted-S actual demand curve
and gives rise to potential multiple equilibria. The hypothesis in this section
suggests that the dual pricing system and the quota on the overall stock supply
represent major policy failures.
4.1 An Inverted-S Demand Curve
The demand curve for a good is typically downward sloping with respect to
price of that good. Recall that derivation of the demand curve is based on a
representative consumer who works out the quantities demanded by maximizing
his utility, taking prices as given. This assumption becomes unrealistic if the
consumer does not, in fact, take the o⁄ering price for granted.
In the Chinese stock market, public investors discount the o⁄ering price if
state shares are expected to be bundled in the public o⁄ering. A hypothetical
example is helpful in illustrating this phenomenon. Suppose a SOE is planning
to convert into a stock company. The enterprise￿ s original capital is divided into
one million state-owned shares. The SOE issues one million additional public
shares for sale on the market. The state acquires state-owned shares at book
value￿ say, one dollar; however, the market price of the public shares o⁄ered
to contemporaneous public investors is much higher than book value￿ say, ￿ve
dollars. At root, this dual-pricing approach arises from the Chinese pattern of
gradual transition.
The o⁄ering is tempered by government policy, which essentially requires
that the enterprise must spend ten percent of the proceeds from public o⁄erings
to buy back state shares. Thus, 0.5 million dollars of the total ￿ve million
dollars (one million shares, valued at ￿ve dollars each) would be taken by the
government. The SOE thereby only receives 4.5 million dollars on a ￿ve-million-
dollar o⁄ering. Ultimately, because of remittances to the government, the SOE
only realizes a portion￿ here, 90%￿ of its potential capitalization. The policy is
equivalent to imposing a tax on the public o⁄ering.
Moreover, the government policy requires that a state share be bought back
at the price of a public share. Thus, 0.1 million of the one million state shares
would return to the enterprise. On the enterprise￿ s balance sheet, the total
number of state shares outstanding would then be 0.9 million while the total
number of public shares outstanding would still be one million. It would appear
that investors would gain more voting rights, based on the increased portion
of public shares relative to state shares. This positive e⁄ect may increase the
demand for public shares. On the other hand, state shares no longer constitutes
majority. Public investors may think that the state would not take full respon-
sibilities for SOE and the bankruptcy risk of SOE would increase. This negative
e⁄ect may decrease the demand of public shares. However, it is important to
4note that in reality the aggregate supply of public shares is unchanged at one
million shares.
Assuming that public investors are rational and that the pricing e⁄ect dom-
inates other e⁄ects, the expected resale of a public share after the buyback is
4.5 dollars. Knowing the state￿ s policy in advance, public investors cut down
on their demand. This loosely captures the notion of rational panics among
public investors. The more state shares are to be reduced through buy back,
the more severe the dilution of the value of a publicly-owned share. It seems
reasonable to suppose that the price expected by public investors will decrease
as the number of state shares to be bought back increases.
This phenomenon can be illustrated in a static model. De￿ne a demand func-
tion D(pe;r), where D is aggregate demand, pe is de￿ned as the price expected
by public investors, and r is the expected ratio of state shares reduced, rela-
tive to the public o⁄erings received by the enterprise. Assume that the inverse




Note that, for each r 2 [0;1], we can draw a demand curve D = D(pe;r). We
shall call each such curve a ￿quasi-demand curve￿or ￿r-demand curve￿ . Figure
2 illustrates a family of r-demand curves, assuming usual downward sloping.
The textbook demand curve is the relation between and r with D(pe;0), which
is shown as in Figure 2. We can see that the demand curve shifts left as r
increases, implying that the expected price decreases for a ￿xed quantity ^ D,
pe( ^ D;r0) < pe( ^ D;r) < pe( ^ D;0) if r0 > r > 0.
Our goal is to construct the ￿actual aggregate demand curve￿from the r-
demand curves. This will depend on interaction between demand and supply.
Let us suppose that the aggregate supply for stock is the usual upward sloping
function of o⁄ering price p, denoted by S (p). As mentioned before, the aggregate
supply of state shares remains unchanged. As shown in ￿gure 3, the supply curve
intersects each r-demand curve. Once state shares are sold, the expected price
of investors is lower than the price o⁄ered by SOE. De￿ne the ratio between two










< 1 if r > 0
Now, given any point on any r-demand curve, we can easily work out the
pe=p that will actually come to prevail. Suppose for instance, we are at point
B and thus the quantities demanded and supplied are OA. Then the expected
price of investors is AB and the o⁄ering price of SOE is AC. Hence the ratio of
two prices is given by AB/AC. Note that B is a point on the r-demand curve. If
AB/AC is not equal to pe=p, the demand can never occur at B. Let us assume
that for the r-demand curve this criterion is satis￿ed at point B. We can then
think of B as a point on the actual demand curve. It is a point that satis￿es
rational panics. In other words, suppose that the quantity is OA when the
expected portion of state shares reduced is r. If investors expect the price to
5be pe, then their demand would be point B, such that their rational panic is
con￿rmed. If on each r-demand curve one picks the point that satis￿es rational
panics, and then connects the dots, the actual aggregate demand curve of stocks
is derived. Let the thick line be such a curve.
Note that the actual aggregate demand curve coincides with the 0-demand
curve (that is the r-demand curve without sale of state shares) to the left of the
supply curve. This is because at any such point, the expected price of investors
exceeds the o⁄ering price. This implies that at these points there are no panics,
only manias.
It is important to note that the actual demand curve folds over itself, forming
an inverted-S shape. The folding property arises endogenously, under diverging
opinions about pricing between investors and SOE. The divergence increases as
the expected proportion of state shares sold increases. This model di⁄ers from
the models of Gennotte and Leland (1990) and Barlevy and Veronesi (2003),
in which inverted-S demand curves were derived using asymmetric information
and misinterpretation among heterogeneous investors
4.2 Government Intervention and Multiple Equilibria
Suppose S(p) in ￿gure 3 represents the supply for the stock. E represents the
only point of equilibrium. The equilibrium price at point E is p￿. It should
be emphasized that the inverted-S demand curve is derived based on upward
sloping (expected) supply curve. However, the actual aggregate supply curve of
public shares is vertical, since there is an implicit overall quota controlled by
the CSRC.
Figure 4 shows the government-implemented aggregate supply curve is ver-
tical. Observe that if the supply curve is perfectly inelastic and quantity was
originally at F, there are three levels of demand that would satisfy rational
panics: H, I, and G, as shown in ￿gure 4(a). Among these points, H and G
are stable equilibrium points while I is unstable one. Suppose the demand that
actually occurs is at H before the crash.
In ￿gure 4(b) the government announces the policy regarding the reduc-
tion of state shares. While, this does not change the aggregate supply, the
actual aggregate demand curve shifts left because the panic is more severe than
when the state shares were actually sold. Although the worsening panic is not
earthshaking, based on the amount of state shares reduced, but it is enough to
eventually shift demand a fractional amount further to the left of the aggregate
supply curve. In reality, the sharp fall did not happen until a month after the
announcement of the government￿ s policy. Using this model, this phenomenon
can be explained by the demand curve getting closer to, but not yet reaching
the critical point E, which is tangent to the vertical supply line. Once this point
was passed in July 2001, the market ￿catastrophe￿occurred. At that point, a
new low-price equilibrium, L, is established.
The government has attempted three possible solutions: (1) the suspension
of the policy, (2) the partial discount of the price of state shares, and (3) the
permanent removal of the policy. As shown in Figure 5(a), none of these so-
6lutions have been successful. A potential small rightward shift of the demand
curve, gained through the suspension of the policy will lead to a small increase
in the equilibrium price. Discounting of the price of state shares might lead the
upper branch of the demand curve to intersect the supply curve. The perma-
nent removal of the policy might bounce the demand curve back to the original
demand level. Indeed, the government￿ s restructuring e⁄orts imply the possi-
bility of multiple equilibria (M, K and N). However, because the crash moved
the demand level down to the lower equilibrium price N, which is locally stable,
it can be expected to prevail, despite the ameliorative e⁄orts of the state. Ul-
timately, the government￿ s e⁄orts are insu¢ cient to induce the necessary price
jump. The market thus settles in the lowest of the multiple equilibria states.
The lower level, stable equilibrium explains the asymmetric jumps, i.e., why the
stock prices remained at a paradoxically low level, even after the government
acknowledged that its policy was a failure.
Due to the local stability of the low-level equilibrium, amelioration of the
crash will be di¢ cult to achieve. Yet, in the mind of the theorist, a recovery
of the market is possible. As shown in Figure 5(b), one way for an upward
jump in prices to be achieved is through a large shift to the left of the supply
line, such that the lower branch of the demand curve passes another critical
tangential point, E￿ . This could be done through the reduction of the implicit
quota on public shares. However, if the supply curve moves too far to the left,
additional privatization of SOE￿ s will become more di¢ cult. Fewer enterprises
will be transformed and reform will slow.
A similar e⁄ect could be achieved through a large shift to the right of the
demand curve. This solution might be accomplished through the infusion of
large quantities of government funds. This, of course, would be infeasible as
the original intent of the reduction of state owned shares was to generate cash
￿ ow for the social security fund. Clearly, spending money to bolster the stock
market would be the equivalent of transferring money from one pocket to the
other. In the end, both large shifts would be di¢ cult to induce.
The smarter solution might be to iron out the irregular demand curve. Es-
sentially, this irregular demand curve is derived from the dual-pricing system.
Thus, the crash can be blamed on the dual-track approach. Indeed, the Chinese
have gained certain advantages through their gradual approach to transition.
Yet, given the drawbacks of the dual-pricing system, particularly the crash dis-
cussed in this paper, further re￿ ection is clearly necessary.
Another solution might be an attempt to increase the slope of the supply
curve in accordance with investor expectations. In terms of policy, this implies
the elimination of the implicit quota system, greater transparency of aggregate
supply, and an increased symmetry of information between the government and
the investor.
75 Conclusions
The model developed in this paper explains the crash of the Chinese stock
market. Empirically, the regime switching model with an absorbing state can
characterize the paradox partially￿ which can explain sustained depression but
cannot explain delayed crash mechanism. Theoretically, rational panics hy-
pothesis is proposed and the crash is explained in terms of irregular demand
and supply curves￿ an inverted-S demand curve and a vertical supply. These
irregularities are blamed on the dual pricing system and the quota on overall
stock supply, which represent major policy failures and are the key to explain
the state-share paradox. The policy implications of this modeling suggest a
removal of these types of irregular pricing schemes.
It is important to point out that this modeling technique can be developed
into a more general theoretical framework. One implication is that the inte-
gration of dual-pricing market systems into unique-pricing markets tends to be
followed by booms and crashes. Other applications could include currency area,
￿nancial liberalizations/contagions, and openness of market during international
trade.
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